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INTRODUCTION

In the 1971 United States Supreme Court decision Richardson v.
Perales,' Justice Blackmun couched the majority ruling on the right
to cross-examine reporting physicians in social security disability
claim hearings in an elaborate, complex sentence that perplexes
analysts of its blackletter content and spawns conflicting interpretations of its subsequent bearing on cases in which cross-examination is requested. In a triumph of verbosity over clarity, Justice
Blackmun stated:
We conclude that a written report by a licensed
physician who has examined the claimant and who
sets forth in his report his medical findings in his
* Victor G. Rosenblum, The Right to Cross-Examine Physicians in Social
Security Disability Cases, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1049 (1999) (Reprinted here with

permission from Florida State University Law Review).
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B., Columbia
University, 1945; LL.B., Columbia University, 1949; Ph.D., University of California at
Berkeley, 1953. I am indebted to my research assistant, Alex Ramirez, for his immensely helpful contributions and initiatives in preparing this Article.
1. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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area of competence may be received as evidence in a
disability hearing and, despite its hearsay character
and an absence of cross-examination, and despite
the presence of opposing direct medical testimony
and testimony by the claimant himself, may constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding by
the hearing examiner adverse to the claimant, when
the claimant has not exercised his right to subpoena
the reporting physician and thereby provide himself
with the opportunity for cross-examination of the
physician.'
On the one hand, Justice Blackmun referred to the cross-examination of the reporting physician as the claimant's "right." This
suggests that the only precondition to obtaining a subpoena to
cross-examine a reporting physician is to duly request it, which the
claimant in Perales did not do. On the other hand, Justice Blackmun, in his "thereby" clause, states that the plaintiff merely has an
"opportunity" for cross-examination. This statement seems to suggest that the claimant's "right" to cross-examination is not absolute. Does a claimant's "right" trump his "opportunity," or does
Justice Blackmun's convoluted statement mean that a claimant's
"opportunity" for cross-examination modifies or supplants his
"right?"
In the aftermath of the Perales decision, federal appellate courts
initially acted compatibly with the view that cross-examination,
once duly requested, was a right.' But in 1996, the Sixth Circuit, in
Calvin v. Chater4 and Flatford v. Chater,5 upheld the Social Security
Administration's (SSA's) rejection of the claimants' requests for
cross-examination. 6 The Sixth Circuit maintained that the Su2. Id. at 402.
3. See, e.g., Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that a claimant
has the right to cross-examine the physician if a subpoena had been requested); Coffin v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that a claimant must be given the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness who submits a report); Townley v. Heckler,
748 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding a due process violation because the claimant was
not permitted to cross-examine an expert after requesting such permission); Gullo v.
Califano, 609 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding a due process violation because the
hearing judge substantially relied on the doctor's report and the claimant was denied
the right to cross-examine the doctor); Figueroa v. Secretary of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 585 F.2d 551 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that even though the claimant made no
request to cross-examine, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) should, out of fairness, ask an unrepresented claimant if he has any questions for the witness).
4. 73 F.3d 87 (6th Cir.1996).
5. 93 F.3d 1296 (6th Cir. 1996).
6. See Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92; Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1300.
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preme Court's formulation of the Perales rule did not create an
absolute right to cross-examination once requested. 7 In the June
1998 decision Yancey v. Apfel,8 the Second Circuit followed the
Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the Perales rule. In Yancey, the
court concluded that the implementation of the claimant's opportunity for cross-examination is properly contingent upon the claimant's showing that a subpoena and cross-examination are necessary
to the full presentation of a case.9
This Article examines the alternative readings and rationales of
Perales regarding the cross-examination of reporting physicians in
social security disability claim hearings. First, Part II compares the
Sixth and Second Circuit's interpretation of the Peralesrule, which
supports the SSA's regulation and interpretation, to the Fifth Circuit's interpretation, which explicitly proclaims cross-examination,
once duly requested, to be an absolute right. Part III questions
whether the Perales Court's declaration that the SSA is "an [impartial] adjudicator and not ...

an advocate or adversary"'" remains

empirically valid. Part IV discusses the SSA's recent assertions of
management prerogatives that constrict the decisional independence of the SSA's Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Part V
questions the Sixth and Second Circuit's draconian predictions that
physicians will be unwilling to participate in social security proceedings if they are required to submit to cross-examination. Currently, this prediction is conjectural and unaccompanied by
authoritative data. Finally, Part VI concludes that cross-examination of reporting physicians in SSA hearings is an absolute right. I
would not object, however, to a reformulation of the SSA's regulation that would make granting claimants' requests for cross-examination of physicians mandatory, unless the ALJ finds that such
cross-examination would be superfluous or dysfunctional.

7. See Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92; Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1300.
8. 145 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
9. See id. at 113 (finding that issuing subpoenas in social security cases is governed by 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1)). The Social Security Administration's regulations
provide that "[w]hen it is reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a case, an
administrative law judge ... may,... at the request of a party, issue subpoenas for the
appearance and testimony of witnesses ...." 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1)(1998).
10. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971).
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JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO CROSS-EXAMINATION AS AN
ABSOLUTE RIGHT

A.

The Sixth Circuit

TWo 1996 Sixth Circuit decisions challenge the Perales interpretation supporting the notion that claimants for Social Security Income benefits have an absolute right to cross-examine reporting
physicians. First, in Calvin v. Chater," a unanimous panel reversed
the district court's ruling that the claimant had an absolute right to
subpoena and cross-examine a physician who provided a pre-hearing report.' 2 Instead, the court insisted that a claimant's opportunity to subpoena and cross-examine a physician would be granted
only upon a timely showing that both are "reasonably necessary for
full presentation of the case."' 3 I will refer to this treatment as the
"Calvin Approach." The panel conjectured that if the physician
had been subpoenaed to testify at the hearing that led to the denial
of the petitioner's claim, it was unlikely that the physician would
have recalled the medical examination which took place more than
two years before the hearing. 4 Based on this reasoning, the court
found that the physician's testimony was not reasonably necessary.' 5 Moreover, despite the principle that due process requires
that a claimant be given an opportunity to cross-examine the individuals who submit reports, the court found that an agency charged
with issuing regulations is not "constitutionally precluded from
prescribing reasonable and proper requirements."' 6
Seven months after the Calvin decision, another Sixth Circuit
panel, comprised of Judges Martin, Batchelder, and Oliver, solidified and expanded the Calvin Approach and applied it to doctors
who provide post-hearing evidence.' 7 Convinced that precisely
drafted interrogatories would have met the claimant's need for any
additional information, the panel concluded that the AL's decision denying the claimant a subpoena was not an abuse of the
11. 73 F.3d 87 (6th Cir. 1996).
12. See id. at 88.
13. Id. at 91.
14. See id. at 92.
15. See id. at 92-94.
16. Id. at 93. The panel concluded its ode to SSA prescription of preconditions
to subpoenas and cross-examination with "[s]ee generally Mathews v Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319... (1976)." The often-invoked Mathews criteria for determining what process is due are considered infra note 39.
17. See Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir. 1996).
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AJ's discretion. 18 The panel also rejected the petitioner's argument that the Calvin Approach violates a claimant's right to procedural due process. 19
Notwithstanding the definitiveness of it conclusion, the panel acknowledged that deciding whether the ALJ abused his discretion in
denying cross-examination was a "close call" because the ALJ
asked for the doctor's testimony after the hearing.20 The panel also
recognized that a heightened danger exists when evidence is gathered post-hearing because the claimant may not have the opportunity to cross-examine the physician . 2a Finally, the panel
acknowledged that the inconvenience or expense of traveling to
the hearing site and additional time may22 discourage the claimant
from requesting a supplemental hearing.
Despite the existing dangers, the court maintained that a supplemental hearing was not necessary even though the doctor failed to
satisfactorily answer a "minimal number of questions. '' a3 Although
an AL's withholding of interrogatories requested by a claimant
could raise concerns, the court reasoned that enough information
was obtained from the doctor through several sets of interrogatories.24 Thus, the court concluded that the ALJ had not abused his
discretion in denying the subpoena.2 5 In coming to this conclusion,
the court reasoned that the ALJ remained an impartial decision
maker throughout the proceeding and had not failed in aiding the
claimant in the full development of his case.26 Furthermore, the
court disregarded the questions to which the doctor was unresponsive because these questions were few in number and were poorly
drafted.2 7

The Flatford panel put a premium on Perales'sreference to "opportunity" for cross-examination and proceeded to hone "opportunity" semantically and situationally until it was reduced to a
privilege to petition the ALJ for an exercise of the latter's discretion. Thus, the panel ruled that courts must uphold ALJ exercises
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id. at 1307.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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of discretion regarding physician cross-examination absent a claimant's proof of bias or an abandonment of impartial decision
making.28
On the other hand, the panel discounted Perales'sreference to a
claimant's "right" to subpoena and cross-examine a physician because the Supreme Court did not discuss whether this right was
absolute or limited. The panel found that the Perales Court's language concerning this "right" was merely dicta. 29 The remaining
question is whether the Sixth Circuit transmuted "opportunity"
and "right" from enforceable mandates to gummy homilies or from
entitlements to dicta.
B.

The Second Circuit

In a tightly reasoned departure from the thrust of the Second
Circuit's previous rulings on the cross-examination of physicians,
the Second Circuit endorsed and allied itself with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Flatford.30 In Yancey v. Apfel, 31 the panel, comprised of Judges Miner, Parker, and Dearie, ruled unanimously
that a claimant does not have an absolute due process right to subpoena a reporting physician and that the AU did not abuse his
discretion in refusing the claimant a subpoena to cross-examine the
physician.32
Prior to Yancey, the Second Circuit explicitly ruled that ALJs
violated the Due Process Clause by relying on evidence the claimant had not been allowed to challenge or rebut. 33 The Second Circuit swerved from this approach by finding that the issue of
whether a disability claimant has an absolute right to subpoena a
reporting physician was an issue of first impression in the Second
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1305.
30. See Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1998).
31. 145 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
32. See id. at 114.
33. See, e.g., Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that
the AU denied due process after the AL failed to allow the claimant to challenge
evidence on which the AU based his ruling); Treadwell v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137,
144 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that basing a decision on uncorroborated hearsay evidence
and the failure to grant and enforce a subpoena violated the claimant's due process
rights); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the AU's
reliance on a post-hearing report without authorizing the claimant to examine or challenge that report violated due process).

The Right to Cross-Examine Physicians
The Ripbt to Cross-Examine Phsicians
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Circuit.34 The Yancey panel deemed that the issue was not explicitly at issue in earlier cases.
Asserting that she had an absolute right to subpoena a reporting
physician, 35 the Yancey claimant further contended that the particular circumstances of her case, including the facts that contradictory medical evidence was presented and that diagnosing systemic
lupus erythematosus (SLE) is difficult and complex, warranted
cross-examination. 36 The Second Circuit, however, gave the claimant's assertions short shrift; the panel conjectured that cross-exami37
nation would have elicited only "redundant information.
In ruling against the claimant, the panel echoed the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Perales's "right to subpoena" rule by reiterating that the Supreme Court failed to address with specificity the
38
issue of whether this "right" was limited or absolute. The Yancey
panel then proceeded to draw on the Supreme Court's analytical
framework for measuring procedural due process, as set forth postPeralesin Mathews v. Eldridge,39 and expanded its view of Mathews
by adopting a rule against establishing an absolute right to subpoena physicians.40
Utilizing the Mathews analytical framework, the Second Circuit
in Yancey, similar to the Sixth Circuit in Flatford, concluded that
cross-examination of reporting physicians is not crucial to the fairness and accuracy of the ALJ's decision. 41 Furthermore, the panel
maintained that the danger of inaccurate medical information or
biased opinions was not great enough in this case to suggest that
the claimant would be denied benefits wrongly without the chance
to cross-examine the doctor. 42 Given the fact that the reporting
34. See Yancey, 145 F.3d at 111.

35. See id.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id. at 113.
Id. at 113.
See id. at 112.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Supreme Court established three factors to

determine whether an administrative procedure is constitutionally sufficient: (1) the
nature and magnitude of private interests affected; (2) the "risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest" and the "value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;" and (3) whether the "additional or substitute procedural requirement"
would financially or administratively burden the government. Id., quoted in Yancey,

145 F.3d at 112 n.8.
40. See Yancey, 145 F.3d at 113.

41. The panel maintained that the nonadversarial nature of SSA adjudications

reduces the need for corss-examination, which is essential to fairness in adversarial

settings. See id.
42. See id.
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physician failed to find that Yancey suffered from SLE, the panel
concluded that the doctor's testimony and cross-examination
would have been redundant and of no use to the ALJ in making his
determination.43
In considering whether due process mandated the cross-examination of reporting physicians, the Yancey panel enveloped its decision within a framework that focused on whether the
Commissioner's decision was justified by substantial evidence in
the record or by an empirical probing of the relationship between
the Mathews factors and the Yancey facts. The panel emphasized
that courts should not reverse a ruling "[w]here an administrative
decision rests on adequate findings sustained by evidence having
4
rational probative force."
If granting a subpoena and cross-examination would have led to
an altered assessment of whether substantial evidence justified the
Commissioner's conclusion, then denial of cross-examination could
have been construed as denial of due process. However, the panel
found that the record indicated no reason for determining a lack of
substantial evidence; the claimant had no proof that cross-examination would have produced testimony transcending "redundant
45
information.
III.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S RULING THAT CROSS-EXAMINATION

Is

A COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS

In Lidy v. Sullivan,4 6 the Fifth Circuit issued the most definitive
and dispositive ruling regarding the right to cross-examination.
The panel, comprised of Judges Gee, Smith, and Weiner, asserted
unanimously that the "better reading" of the Supreme Court's Perales language is that it grants claimants an absolute right to subpoena reporting physicians. 47
In Lidy, the SSA argued that the Perales decision limits the
claimant's right to subpoena and cross-examine reporting physicians, and used the SSA's regulations to bolster this argument. 48
43. See id.
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 114.
46. 911 F. 2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990).
47. See id. at 1077.
48. See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404. 950(d), which authorizes the ALJ to decide
whether the requested cross-examination is "reasonably necessary for the full presentation of the case").
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To support this interpretation, the SSA relied on language from
Perales that expressed a concern about "the cost of providing live
need has not been demonstrated by a
medical testimony... where
49
subpoena.
a
for
request
The panel, however, rejected the SSA's interpretation of this
language and maintained that the language is unclear as to whether
the request should purport an adequate showing of need -- the interpretation undoubtedly supported by the Secretary -- or the
mere "filing of a request ipso facto constitutes a demonstration of
need."' 50 Instead, the Lidy panel maintained that the Supreme
Court's reference to the "right to subpoena" confers the right to
cross-examine upon the claimant if the claimant requests a subpoena. 51 As a result, the court concluded that the claimant need
not show whether cross-examination was "reasonably necessary for
the full presentation of the case," as the SSA's regulation provided.52 Thus, according to the Fifth's Circuit's interpretation of
Perales, the claimant has an absolute right to have her request
granted.53
The Fifth Circuit panel added frosting and controversy to its
cake by remarking in conclusion, "We are persuaded, as well, by
the fact that all of the circuit courts of appeals that have addressed
this issue read Peralesas conferring an absolute right to subpoena a
reporting physician. '54 Although the other circuits' decisions on
49. Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971)).

50. Id.
51. See id. (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 402).
52. Id.

53. See id.
54. Id. (citing Coffin v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990); Wallace v. Bowen,
869 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1988); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1984); Figuroa
v. Secretary, 585 F.2d 351 (1st Cir. 1978)). The panel's evaluation of the Wallace case
was overtly challenged as erroneous by then-Solicitor General Kenneth Starr in the
government's petition for certiorari. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.5, Lidy
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 959 (1991 (No. 90-1344). The Solicitor General was partially
correct in that the Wallace panel recognized that compliance with the SSA's regula-

tion was a necessary subject of inquiry by the courts. See Wallace, 869 F.2d at 191.

The ruling and comments of the panel, however, overtly contradicted the SSA's
stance that it legitimately denied cross-examination in the case. See id. at 194. The

panel ordered the Secretary to afford the claimant the right to cross-examine the phy-

sicians whose opinions had been received post-hearing. The court added: "We disagree with the Secretary's evaluation of the utility of cross-examination in such a

situation. Effective cross-examination could reveal what evidence the physician considered or failed to consider in formulating his or her conclusions ...

and whether

there are any qualifications to the physician's conclusions." Id. at 192. Thus, while

recognizing that cross-examination is properly contingent on being necessary to the
full presentation of the case, the panel ruled that the threshold of necessity perceived
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which the Lidy panel relied were by no means incompatible with
its ruling, the Lidy panel was distinctive in insisting that compliance with the SSA's regulation should not be examined at all by
the court because cross-examination is explicitly an absolute
right.-"
To no avail, then-Solicitor General Kenneth Starr and his staff
made elaborate legal and policy arguments for the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari. The fifteen-page petition for certiorari argued
that the issues at stake were of substantial significance to the
proper administration of the federal disability benefits program
and to federal administrative actions generally.5 6 According to the
Solicitor General, the Fifth Circuit's holding: (1) "threatens to impose enormous financial and procedural burdens on a program
under which millions of claims are filed every year; ' 57 (2) "failed to
apply the three-part analysis of due process requirements articulated by this Court, and applied by the Court to Social Security Act
eligibility determinations, Mathews v. Eldridge;' ' 58 (3) "failed to
consider whether an 'absolute right' to subpoena and examine reporting physicians would materially alter the risk of erroneous eligibility determinations and whether such a right would unduly and
inefficiently burden the administrative process;" 59 (4) "concluded
that the due process right of a disability applicant to subpoena and
examine reporting physicians had been established ...

as a direct

holding in its decision in Richardson v. Perales," and "misapplied
this Court's decisions and has created a conflict with the decisions
of other courts of appeals; ' 60 (5) "erroneously cited Wallace v.
Bowen as support for its holding;"' 6 1 (6) "mistakenly read Peralesto
require that subpoenas be granted without a demonstration of
'need'; ' 62 and (7) "will inevitably cause confusion and inefficiency
by the district court did not coincide with that of the SSA and that in this instance at
least, "the AU must afford the claimant not only an opportunity to comment and
present evidence but also an opportunity to cross-examine the authors." Id. at 193.
55. See Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1077.
56. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Lidy (No. 90-1344).
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 7-8.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. at 13 n.5. In Wallace the Third Circuit held that due process requires that
Al~s allow subpoenas "when cross-examination is necessary to the full presentation
of the case." Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1988).
62. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Lidy (No. 90-1344).
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in the national administration of the federal benefits program" and
"should therefore be resolved by this Court."63
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Lidy case on June 3,
1991. 64 Effective December 31, 1991, the SSA agreed to accept the
Fifth Circuit's ruling on cross-examination in all cases issued out of
that circuit.65
IV.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGENCY ACQUIESCENCE IN THE
FIFrtH CIRCUIT'S RULING?

The predictions of draconian consequences that inevitably will
ensue if cross-examination of physicians is upheld as an absolute
right are puzzling. 66 I asked a sample of social security practitioners in the Fifth Circuit to comment on the effects of the SSA's acquiescence in the Fifth Circuit's Lidy ruling. The sample was not
scientifically drawn. Instead, I randomly selected fifteen practitioners who have varying ranges of experience in the social security
context and with whom or whose work I had no prior knowledge.
I addressed the following letter to the selected practitioners:
Dear:
As part of an ongoing research project regarding
the right to subpoena an examining physician for
cross-examination purposes in social security cases,
one of my students came across Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 91-(5) which states that when a
claimant requests a subpoena for cross-examination
purposes, the adjudicator must issue the subpoena.
See 56 Fed. Reg. 67,625. This ruling which is limited
63. Id. at 14.
64. See Sullivan v. Lidy, 500 U.S. 959, 959 (1991). Justice White cast one vote for
certiorari.
65. Notice of Acquiescence, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,625, 67,625 (1991). The SSA specified that this ruling applies only to cases involving claimants for disability insurance
benefits and/or supplemental security income payments based on disability who reside in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas at the time of the proceedings at the disability
hearing, ALJ, or Appeals Council levels. In such cases, when a claimant requests that
a subpoena be issued for the purpose of cross-examining an examining physician prior
to the closing of the record, the adjudicator must issue the subpoena. See id.
66. Without citing any empirical evidence, the Sixth Circuit in Flatford asserted
that a consequence of an absolute right to subpoena would be that "the number of
physicians willing to provide medical advice to the administrative law judge would
drop." Flatford v. Chater, 93 f.3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit
echoed the Sixth Circuit and concluded that "practical concerns" about financial and
administrative burdens "strongly militate against ... establishing an absolute right to
subpoena reporting physicians." Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 1998).
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to the Fifth Circuit is contrary to the SSA's policy
elsewhere that a claimant's right to subpoena is qualified. See C.F.R. §§ 404.950(d)(1)(2).
In order to better understand what kind of impact
this ruling has had in the Fifth Circuit, I would
greatly appreciate any comments or reactions you
may have regarding this ruling. I am particularly interested in any thoughts you may have on the following issues:
1. The chilling effect, if any, on the number of physicians willing to provide medical advice to the
ALJ due to the possibility of being subject to
cross-examination as suggested by Judge Martin
in Flatfordv. Chater,93 F.3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir.
1996); and
2. The effectiveness of cross-examination in social
security cases.
I would be most grateful for any feedback regarding the above mentioned issues. Thank you in advance for your help.
Sincerely Yours,
I received seven responses to this letter, six of which are quoted
below. The seventh was unresponsive. Although certainly not dispositive of the issue, none of the respondents perceived any chilling
effect on doctors' willingness to participate or any adverse effects
on SSA or ALJ efficacy. Cross-examination was not deemed necessary or desirable in all cases; it was valuable for enhancing specificity in the record and for accessing, confronting, or excluding
nebulous or biased reports.
Typical of the responses were these by practitioners in Texas and
Louisiana, to which I assigned numbers to preserve confidentiality.
1. I spoke with Administrative Law Judge
__
, as to the experience the ALJs in the
Office have had in regard to subpoenas of consultative examiners. He indicated that between ten percent and fifteen percent of the cases will have a
subpoena issued for the consultative examiner to be
cross-examined.
I have perpetuated a social security practice for a
number of years and have found that the same doctors appear from time to time at the different hearings. I have found that the courts are much more
likely to look closely at the regular treating physi-
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cians who have had hands-on care of the claimant,
along with test results and laboratory findings over a
period of years rather than the one-time examining
physician's findings. I find all too often that the examining physicians hired by the State Disability Determination Division will be requested to give their
opinion; however, they are not provided with the
money to do necessary X-rays, MRIs and other objective tests which would help the doctors to get a
better determination of just what is going on with
the claimant's impairments. Also, it is very difficult,
it not impossible, to learn just which of the medical
records have been sent to the consultative examiner
prior to the examination to give him information to
predicate the examination he is giving.
2. The Social Security Administration, through
the various state Disability Determination Services,
procures "consultative" medical examinators of, I
would guess, a majority of claimants. ALJs also employ "medical advisors" who typically appear at the
hearing, listen to the testimony and offer opinions
regarding the listings and medical assessments of
mental and physical limitations. The former groups
are primarily the target of a claimant's subpoena.
I do not believe subpoena power in the Office of
Hearing and Appeals (OHA), where my practice is
centered, has a chilling effect on their willingness to
conduct examinations for the agency. Acutally,
OHA has no real mechanism for the issuance of a
subpoena. The ALJ simply calls the doctor and politely asks him to appear at the hearing. I have requested the appearance of examining physicians on
several occasions because the interpretation of their
medical assessments could be the difference between
and award or denial of benefits. I generally assume
an ALJ will interpret a vague medical assessment to
deny benefits. The examining physicians want Social
Security's business and, I believe, do better examinations and write clearer reports when they may have
to account for them in court.
3. First, I believe there has been no "chilling effect" on the willingness of physicians to perform disability examinations for the Social Security
Administration, as a result of this ruling. I have
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been practicing Social Security disability law for
more than twenty years, and physicians who are willing to perform consultative examinations for the
government in Social Security disability cases, are
more plentiful now than they ever have been in the
past. Of the many factors that influence physicians'
willingness to participate in this system, the impact
of the Lidy decision and Social Security Agency
Regulation 91-(5) is so small as to be negligible. I
would bet that subpoenas are requested in well
under one percent of all cases heard by ALJs in the
Dallas, Fort Worth and Houston areas where I practice, and probably throughout the Fifth Circuit.
Even when we do request subpoenas, they are rarely
issued, despite Lidy, for a variety of reasons, e.g. the
AU may have decided on his own that the opinion
of the doctor for who a subpoena was requested is
not reliable. Also, subpoenas issued by ALJs are
not enforceable, and it is time consuming and cumbersome to obtain an enforceable subpoena. It may
be more expeditious to simply obtain another
examination.
In cases where we have succeeded in obtaining
cross-examination of a consultative physician, the
outcomes have varied. We have had a number of
cases in which physicians who had submitted written
reports that appeared adverse to our clients, ended
up giving testimony that was extremely helpful to
our cases. In other cases, the cross-examination did
not alter an adverse outcome. Of course, there are
other ways to measure "effectiveness of cross-examination" aside from whether it alters the outcome of
the decision. The Social Security disability adjudication system is a system of "mass justice" in which the
economics of providing consultative examination
services to the government sometimes results in abbreviated, shoddy examinations and poorly written
reports. Some physicians become so dependent
upon the government for sending them large numbers of these cases that they may lose their objectivity altogether.
4. I have practiced social security law for the
past eight years, almost exclusively for the past five
years. In my experience an examining physician is
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rarely cross-examined. On those few occasions
where I have requested that the examining physician
be subpoenaed, the physician greatly resisted the
subpoena to the point where the AU struck the report from the record and scheduled a new consultative examination. Obviously I feel that all
practitioners use the subpoena power very limitedly
and only where an examining physician's report is so
contrary to the remaining evidence of record that it
has not had a chilling effect on physicians.
5. I customarily invoke the rule of the Lidy Decision for two reasons:
1. To block the use by the Social Security Administration of evidence provided by a particular examining physician.
2. To seek to exclude the reports of consulting
physicians whose reports demonstrate significant bias against social security claimants.
With respect to your question about the "chilling
effect" on physicians, I do not believe there is one.
In those instances where subpoenas are issued in my
cases, the subpoenas are routinely ignored by the
physicians. Because of the weak and cumbersome
enforcement process, the only effect of the subpoena, as a practical matter, is to furnish the grounds
for a motion to exclude the doctor's report or
records. This motion is usually, although not uniformly, granted.
In sum, in my practice the physician subpoena is
usually a tactical tool, which is issued with the expectation that the physician actually will not appear and
testify.
6. First, I have no information whatsoever about
any chilling effect on the number of physicians willing to provide medical advice to the ALU. It appears
to me that a more important factor leading to a low
number of Disability Determination Services physicians is the perceived "small fee" paid to physicians
and psychologists. Most medical experts testifying at
my clients' hearing are retired physicians.
Second, the effectiveness of my cross-examination
of the testifying doctors at the hearing seems directly
related to the ALI's willingness to let me do a complete cross-examination. It seems that many of the
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newly hired ALJs view the medical experts and/or
consultants as someone they are supposed to protect
from my questions. Other, more experienced ALJs,
let me do whatever cross-examination I feel is appropriate to the case.
From my perspective, the Fifth Circuit has turned
from an occasionally claimant oriented court in the
1960s to an almost wholly defense oriented court. It
rarely, if ever, finds in favor of a claimant.
Lastly, my rare experiences with requesting a subpoena from an ALJ have produced variable results.
Mostly the ALJs will issue the subpoena. Sometimes they ignore my request. When they ignore my
request, about half the time I interpret this to mean
that they are leaning toward finding the client disabled and do not want to go through the bother of
subpoenaing a consulting physician, and the client
usually wins.
These responses strongly suggest that the negative conjectures
shared by the Second and Sixth Circuits and the Solicitor General
regarding the effects of allowing physicians cross-examination as
an absolute right should not be admitted as credible unless and
until clear and convincing empirical support can be found in the
record to validate them.67
The Mathews factors68 for determining the dimensions of due
process required in particular cases should not be transformed into
instruments of hyperbole and exaggeration. They warrant and require concrete factual data as measurements of the risks of erroneous deprivations of claimants' interests and of the fiscal and
administrative burdens on governmental interests. In addition,
there should be continuing awareness that governmental interests
extend beyond efficiency and integrity. As the Supreme Court
pointed out in Goldberg v. Kelly, 69 "From its founding the Nation's
basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of
all persons within its borders. '7° Mathews did not dispute
Goldberg's point that affording people their rights and entitle67. These responses are by no means conclusive enough to prove that the SSA's
acquiescence of Lidy produced no chilling effects on doctor's participation, no enormous escalation of the financial costs, and no incursions on efficient administration of

the system.
68. See supra note 39.
69. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

70. Id. at 264-65.
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ments are means by which "important governmental interests are
promoted."' 7 1 Indeed, Mathews arguably alluded to these governmental interests in affording people their rights and entitlements in
specifying "the function involved" as a component of governmental interest.72
V.

SHOULD THE "NONADVERSARIAL"

STATUS OF SOCIAL

SECURITY HEARINGS AFFECT THE AVAILABILITY OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION?

In Perales, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the nonadversarial
nature of social security proceedings warrant greater informality
and flexibility in the presentation and evaluation of evidence as
support for accepting hearing evidence of physicians as substantial
evidence when the claimant failed to subpoena the reporting physician for cross-examination.73 Justice Blackmun maintained that
typical reporting physicians have no interest in the outcome of the
proceedings beyond professional curiosity.74 Only Justice Douglas,
in dissent, echoed the challenge by Perales' counsel to the SSA's
claim of nonadversariality.75 Perales's counsel argued that the government is being unrealistic when it maintains that a disability
hearing is not adversarial; in actuality, the presiding officer gathers
evidence, decides which evidence to present, and seeks to
strengthen the government's case as much as possible.76 Justice
Douglas scoffed at the fairness of the SSA's practices in using "circuit-riding" doctors' claims without submitting them to crossexamination.77
To condition the grant or denial of cross-examination on whether
or not proceedings may aptly be termed "nonadversarial" rewards
form over substance. The rationale for cross-examination that
Dean Wigmore phrased with such eloquence and grace depends
71. Id. at 264.
72. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at

263-66).
73. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
74. Justice Blackmun described the typical medical reports as "routing, standard
and unbiased," id. at 404, and maintained that the "specter of questionable credibility
and veracity is not present," id. at 407.
75. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. See Brief for Respondent at 27, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)
(No. 108).
77. See Perales, 402 U.S. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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not at all on the adversariness of the forum, but the substance of its
reliance and reliability for credible evidence. As Wigmore stated:
For two centuries past, the policy of the AngloAmerican system of evidence has been to regard the
necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital
feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard for
testing the value of human statements is comparable
to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by special exception) should be used as testimony until it has been
probed and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength and lengthening experience.
To predict with certainty what gaps or gaffes cross-examination
may identify would be a fruitless or fictional assignment. As Roy
Reardon makes clear: "Conducting an effective cross-examination
always involves instantaneous interplay with the witness. It is
therefore impossible to read a cross-examination out of a 'black
loose-leaf book' or to adhere rigidly to a formal outline. Spontaneity is essential . . . 79 Granted, there may be and are occasions
when counsel abuse the right to cross-examination by endless, repetitive questions or efforts to substitute brow-beating and intimidation for inquiry. That is when presiding officers have the
authority and duty to call a halt. But to require a claimant to
prove, as a condition of obtaining a subpoena, that cross-examination will assure production of evidence not available by interrogatories or other written inquiries destroys cross-examination's
primacy as a safeguard of accuracy. The hurdles blocking access to
cross-examination serve as shields against physicians' accountability for the specificity and validity of their reports.
The Sixth and Second Circuit panels maintained that the SSA
appropriately placed the discretion to grant or deny subpoenas and
cross-examinations in the hands of SSA's ALJs and that ALU decisions should be reversed in such matters only for abuse of discretion.8" The exercise of discretion requires independence of SSA
decisional directives, but any assumption of ALJ freedom from
SSA decisional direction needs reexamination today in light of con78. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
79. Roy L. Reardon, Cross-Examination "To Sin or Not to Sin," 25 LITIG. 30
(1998), available in WESTLAW, 25 NO. 1 LITIG. 30, at *2.
80. See Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d
1296 (6th Cir. 1996).
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tinuing assertion of the SSA's "managerial" authority, which includes prescriptions for decision making.
The SSA has declared, and not yet repudiated, that ALJs must
adhere in their decisions to the SSA's policies, notwithstanding
court decisions to the contrary. Unless SSA management decides
to acquiesce in a court's holding (as the SSA did after the Supreme
court denied certiorari in the Lidy holding of the Fifth Circuit),
ALJ decision making is bound by SSA's policies and SSA's interpretation of the applicable law. 8 1 By insisting explicitly that "[a]n
AL is bound to follow SSA policy even if, in the AL's opinion,
the policy is contrary to law,"' 82 the SSA denigrates the decisional
integrity and commitment of the rule of law and subordinates their
professional judgement to the politically fueled policies of SSA
management. ALJs who might have the temerity to adhere to the
court's ruling that contravene SSA policies are warned by the General Counsel that "[a]long with the authority to set these policies,
of course, goes the authority to ensure that these policies are carried out and, where appropriate, i.e. where a factual basis exists, to
83
discipline ALJs for violation of such policies.
Given rulings by the circuit courts of appeals affirming that administrative agencies "are required to abide by the law of this Circuit in matters arising within the jurisdiction of this Circuit until
and unless it is changed by this court or reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States,"" it is difficult to avoid labeling the
General Counsel's instruction to ALJs as a requirement to engage
in contempt of court. If the SSA believes that its policy choices
can, with impunity, challenge and trump circuit court rulings, it is
disingenuous at best for it to argue concomitantly that its mode of
operation is nonadversarial and, hence, is entitled to exercise
greater flexibility and informality in decision making. Vis a vis circuit court judges, its own ALJs, and claimants petitioning for benefits, the SSA is about as nonadversarial as whiskey is
81. See Social Security Administration General Counsel Memorandum, Legal
Foundations of the Duty of Impartiality in the Hearing Process and its Applicability
to Administrative Law Judges 5-6 (Jan. 28, 1997) (on file with author).
82. Id.

83. Id. at 18.
84. Industrial TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1997)
(quoting United States Dep't. of Energy v. FLRA, 106 F.3d 1155, 1165 (4th Cir. 1997
(Lultig, J., concurring)); see also Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 135 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding that the FCC must abide by the Eighth Circuit's rulings, reasoning that
the FCC is not an equal of the court and the court has the ultimate duty to determine
what the law is).
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nonalcoholic. 85 The time is ripe to reaffirm that the right to crossexamination is an integral component of fairness in constitutional
and administrative adjudications. This right should not be truncated or compromised by meretricious pretenses of
nonadversariality.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Legal education teaches us to be wary of absolutes such as "always" and "never." Notwithstanding my preference for cross-examination of physicians as an absolute right, I recognize the
potential for abuse at the fringe through needless and wasteful duplication or pedantry. Consequently, I could support a reformulation of the SSA regulation on cross-examination that affirms and
asserts the right of claimants to cross-examine physicians but also
authorizes ALJs, for good cause found, to suspend or deny crossexamination where clear and convincing evidence in the record
warrants the conclusion that the testimony sought is or would be
irrelevant, dysfunctional, or unduly repetitive. The important difference between the present regulation and my suggestion lies in
the burden of proof. Whereas the SSA places the claimant in the
position of a mendicant who must prove to the SSA's satisfaction
that the cross-examination is necessary, my suggestion would recognize the claimant's right to cross-examine the reporting physician unless the clear and convincing threshold of proof to the
contrary has been met.
85. I have suggested steps toward a collegial, rather than the present hierarchical
approach, in the SSA's relationships with ALJs. See Victor G. Rosenblum, Toward
Heightening Impartiality in Social Security Agency Proceedings Involving Administrative Law Judges, 18 J. NAT'L ASS'N ALl's 58, 68-71 (1998). For a searing critique of
SSA's "unusually informal administrative model," see Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada
Meets Kafka: The Misapplicationof the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to InquisitorialAdministrative Proceedings,97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289 (1997).

